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LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
H. Alston Johnson III*
LOCAL OR SPECIAL LEGISLATION
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, like its predecessor,
contains a prohibition against local or special legislation on
enumerated subjects.1 Such a prohibition, common in state
constitutions, 2 is intended to reflect a policy decision that
legislative resources and attention should be concentrated
upon matters of general interest, and that purely local mat-
ters should be left to local governing authorities. 3
There has been in the past some confusion of the terms
local and special. "Local" laws are those that operate only in
a particular locality or localities without the possibility of
extending their coverage to other areas should the requisite
criteria of statutory classification exist there.4 A "special"
law is one that confers particular privileges, or imposes pecu-
liar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a
common right upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected
from the general body of those who stand in precisely the
same relation to the subject of the law.5 Either type of law on
the subjects enumerated in the two Louisiana constitutions
would be unconstitutional, but the two types clearly are not
the same.
One prohibited subject common to both the 1921 and the
1974 constitutions is "changing the law of descent or succes-
sion" or "giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds or
to any illegal disposition of property."6 In Teachers' Retire-
ment System v. Vial,7 the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained
legislation permitting members of the teachers' retirement
system to dispose of benefits due from the system by mere
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12; La. Const. art. IV, § 4 (1921).
2. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 19.
3. See H. READ, J.-MAcDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, LEGISLATION
546 (3rd ed. 1973).
4. Comment, General and Special Laws in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 768,
770 (1956), cited in Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial, 317 So. 2d 179, 182
n.12 (La. 1975).
5. City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
6. LA. CONsT. art. III, § 12; La. Const. art. IV, § 4 (1921).
7. 317 So. 2d 179 (La. 1975).
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completion of a printed form, not in the form of a will, and
without being subject to the Civil Code rules on forced por-
tions. One ground of the attack had been that the statute
permitting such disposal was local or special. The court held
that the statute was not restricted in its application to any
particular locale, or to any particular group of teachers; it
accordingly rejected the argument. The decision contains a
brief but informative discussion of local or special legislation.8
One of the continuing problems in the field of local or
special legislation has been the controversy over whether the
sale of intoxicating liquors of varying alcoholic content ought
to be permitted in the various parishes. Although a detailed
examination of this intricate problem cannot be undertaken
at this juncture, several remarks can be made about the
recent decision in Nomey v. State.9 At issue in Nomey was the
constitutionality of Act 41 of 1974, purporting to authorize a
parish-wide referendum, upon the petition of 25% of the qual-
ified voters, on four different questions relating to the per-
mitted sale of beverages of varying alcoholic content. The
same act stated in a second section that the parish-wide ref-
erendum on the four questions was authorized only in 12
enumerated parishes.1 0 Voters in the remaining parishes
could not conduct a referendum that would be binding
parish-wide; if they conducted a referendum in a ward or an
incorporated municipality, the referendum was limited spec-
ifically to three of the four questions."
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted supervisory writs
to examine the propriety of a temporary restraining order
issued by a district court enjoining an election under Act 41,
which the district court called "patently unconstitutional. 1 2
Apparently on the basis that the statute was local in charac-
ter because "its parish-wide application"1 3 was limited to 12
parishes, and that the subject matter was within the prohibi-
tions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921,14 the Louisiana
8. Id. at 182-83.
9. 315 So. 2d 709 (La. 1975).
10. The parishes were Beauregard, Washington, Rapides, Natchitoches,
Red River, Grant, LaSalle, East Carroll, West Carroll, Bienville, Jackson and
Winn.
11. See La. Acts 1974, No. 41 § 2, enacting LA. R.S. 26:581.1.
12. The Louisiana Supreme Court quotes the district court's language in
its opinion at 315 So. 2d at 711.
13. 315 So. 2d at 712.
14. As pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Sanders in his dissent, the Con-
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 551
Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. 15
There were two strong dissents, one of which raised the ques-
tion of whether the numerous "Orleans Parish excepted"
statutes found in Louisiana statute books might be placed in
jeopardy because of the majority's opinion: "If geographical
exceptions to state-wide statutes render them invalid, then
many statutes on the books reciting 'Orleans Parish excepted'
are in jeopardy."' '
It is respectfully suggested that the "Orleans Parish ex-
cepted" statutes are not based upon geographical determina-
tions, but on population, a rather common and accepted
means of distinguishing among classes singled out in legisla-
tion.17 This is not at all to say that the legislative technique of
treating Orleans Parish in a separate category is wise. It is
also not to say that geography might never be considered a
reasonable basis for classification in legislation, including
some areas and excluding others. 8 But any classification-
geography, population, or whatever-must be reasonable,
"based on a substantial difference between the class created
and the subjects excluded."' 9 The delineation by named
parishes in Act 41, when those parishes are scattered from
Washington Parish in the extreme southeast to Beauregard
in the extreme southwest to East and West Carroll in the
extreme northeast, does not seem to be based upon such a
substantial difference.
Two observations are pertinent concerning the common
legislative technique in Louisiana of excepting Orleans Par-
ish. One may define a category by use of population figures
(e.g., "In all parishes with a population in excess of 450,000....")
rather than by specific enumeration of the parish in ques-
tion. As long as the criteria for the population class do not
stitution of 1974 was not yet in effect when the controversy in question arose,
and thus the provisions of the Constitution of 1921 were the operative provi-
sions.
15. The court also based its conclusion of unconstitutionality on equal
protection grounds.
16. 315 So. 2d at 715.
17. See, e.g., Farrington v. Pickney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 133 N.E.2d 817 (1956).
18. See discussion in State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192 (1965)
(court upheld a criminal trespass statute, applicable only in Jefferson Davis
Parish, that had been passed prior to the specific prohibition in the present
constitution against local or special legislation "defining any crime"); LA.
CONST. art. III, § 12. See also discussion in text at note 22, infra.
19. Comment, General and Special Laws in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 768,
775 (1956).
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prohibit subsequent entrance of other cities that reach the
specified population, the legislation does not lose its character
as a "general" statute.20 In fact, this technique seems to be in
increasing use in Louisiana. Also, it may be time to re-
examine the treatment of any single parish as disproportion-
ately larger than the others in population, since current cen-
sus figures reveal that the enormous disparity between the
population of Orleans and that of other parishes is rapidly
disappearing.21
Definition of Crime
The Constitution of 1974 adds to the prohibited subjects
of local or special legislation statutes "defining any crime. '22
There is little doubt that this language, added as a floor
amendment, was aimed at stopping the proliferation of crimi-
nal trespass statutes applicable only in designated parishes. 23
This salutary effort, however, will be for naught if the legisla-
ture continues to pass acts such as Act 112 of 1975, defining
criminal trespass in the parishes of Catahoula and Concordia.
This act appears to conflict with the Constitution of 1974,
casting grave doubt upon its validity.
There may also be some doubt about the validity of exist-
ing criminal trespass statutes applicable only in certain
parishes, including Louisiana R.S. 14:63.1-63.11, in the light of
the provisions of article XIV, § 18(B) of the Constitution of
1974: "Laws which are in conflict with this constitution shall
cease upon its effective date."
FISCAL SESSIONS
The Constitution of 1921 provided for alternating annual
sessions of 60 days and 30 days, the latter occurring in odd-
numbered years and being for the principal purpose of con-
sidering fiscal matters. It was possible to extend budget ses-
sions to non-fiscal matters, but this required "the consent of
20. Id. at 774.
21. Compare a disparity between Orleans and the next closest parish in
1940 of some 500,000 to 150,000 and the present disparity of some 600,000 to
340,000 according to 1970 census figures. LOUISIANA ALMANAC, 1973-1974, at
102-03 (1973).
22. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12(10).
23. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VER-
BATIM TRANSCRIPTS, 112th day at 25.
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three-fourths of the elected members of each house." The
common legislative practice had been to achieve the required
consent to introduce a bill by means of a concurrent resolu-
tion; if the resolution received three-fourths vote of the
elected members, the bill was introduced and thereafter was
handled in the normal course. Only a majority vote then was
required for final passage.
A remark made by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sul-
lins v. City of Shreveport2 5 in 1968 cast doubt upon the valid-
ity of that procedure. According to the court's opinion in
Sullins, the constitutional language "does not require the
three-fourths vote to consider a non-fiscal matter, it requires
three-fourths vote to enact a proposed non-fiscal matter."26 In
fact, the 1921 constitution merely stated that "any proposal
to extend" the session to non-fiscal matters required three-
fourths consent.
The Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion during this
past term to clarify the issue. In State v. Reado,27 the defen-
dant's motion to quash an indictment for second-degree mur-
der had been granted on the ground that the statute under
which he was charged was passed in a fiscal session without a
three-fourths vote in favor of the bill; the language in Sullins
was cited as authority. Upon the state's appeal to the su-
preme court, the language in Sullins was properly "overruled"
and the court correctly held that the statute in question
was constitutional since it received a three-fourths vote to
extend the session and a majority vote for final passage. 28
While it is true that the fiscal session has now passed into
Louisiana constitutional history, since the Constitution of
1974 provides for annual 60-day sessions within an 85-day
period, 29 this does not eliminate possible constitutional at-
tacks upon legislation passed under the Constitution of 1921.
It is commendable that the Louisiana Supreme Court cor-
rected its earlier misleading statement on the subject of
non-fiscal legislation within fiscal sessions.
24. La. Const. art. III, § 8 (1921): "[A]ny proposal to extend the budget
session to matters other than those enumerated in this paragraph, whether
proposed by the governor or by the legislature, shall require the consent of
three-fourths of the elected members of each house. .
25. 252 La. 423, 211 So. 2d 314 (1968).
26. Id. at 428, 211 So. 2d at 317.
27. 295 So. 2d 440 (La. 1974).
28. Id. at 443.
29. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2(A).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS
Although a fiscal session could be extended to non-fiscal
matters under the Constitution of 1921, no provision existed
to extend an extraordinary session beyond the call for the
session, 30 and there is none in the new constitution. 31 How-
ever, there was a provision in the 1921 constitution mandat-
ing the calling of an extraordinary session upon the vote of
two-thirds of the elected members of the legislature, 2 a vote
reduced by the 1974 constitution to a majority. 33 During the
first extraordinary session of 1975, an effort was made to use
this procedure to call a "special session within a special ses-
sion" to consider a subject not within the governor's call for
the special session. The effort failed, and the legislature, in
Act 50 of that same session, provided that "when either the
governor or the legislature has called an extraordinary ses-
sion of the legislature, neither the governor nor the legisla-
ture shall call another extraordinary session to overlap or
run concurrently with the first extraordinary session." 34 Al-
though the intention of this language is clear and the concept
probably desirable, it might be argued that it runs counter to
the plain language of the Constitution of 1974, which states
that the legislature "shall be convened by the presiding
officers of both houses upon written petition of a majority of
the elected members of each house," without qualification.35
LEGISLATIVE DAY
In its first decision interpreting the legislative article of
the Constitution of 1 9 7 4 ,m the Louisiana Supreme Court was
asked to examine the new concept of a "legislative day" and
determine what actions the legislature might appropriately
take on such a day. The new constitution provides that, in its
30. La. Const. art. V, § 14 (1921).
31. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The power to legislate shall be limited,
under penalty of nullity, to the objects specifically enumerated in the proc-
lamation ..
32. La. Const. art. V, § 14 (1921).
33. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2(B).
34. La. Acts 1975, First Ex. Sess., No. 50.
35. Perhaps it is of significance that the verb used is "convened," and it
could be argued that the provision cannot apply when the legislature is
already in session, since it cannot then be "convened" in the literal sense.
36. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975) (interpreting LA. CONST.
art. III).
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regular session each year, the legislature shall meet for not
more than 60 legislative days during a period of 85 calendar
days, a legislative day being "a calendar day on which either
house is in session." 37
Two legislators posed several issues in a suit seeking a
declaratory judgment, brought to the Louisiana Supreme
Court under its supervisory jurisdiction. The first issue was
whether a day on which legislative committees were meeting
but neither house was in session would constitute a legisla-
tive day. Inferentially recognizing that legislative commit-
tees are not identical with the full house, and in fact only
make recommendations to be acted upon by the full house,
the court correctly held that such a day would not constitute
a legislative day.
The second issue was linked to the first: if such a day is
not a "legislative day," may a committee validly meet and
take action upon a bill on that day? The court noted that no
constitutional provision prohibits committee meetings on
non-legislative days, and that the legislature is described in
the constitution as a continuous body for the purpose of per-
mitting committees to meet and act when the legislature is
not in session.38 The court might also have added that article
III, § 1 of the Constitution of 1974 states that the "legislative
power of the state is vested" in the legislature, a statement
usually taken to mean that anything normally forming a part
of the powers of a legislative body and not specifically prohib-
ited by the constitution may properly be undertaken by the
legislature. 39 Certainly the meeting of committees is a normal
power, and there is no reason at all why these committees
cannot meet on any day, whether the legislature itself is in
session or not.40
37. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2(A).
38. 313 So. 2d at 580.
39. See, e.g., the treatment given to the investigative powers of legislat-
ing bodies, and the conclusion that these powers are inherent within the
legislative power unless specifically excluded or limited. H. READ, J. MAC-
DONALD, J. FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, LEGISLATION 318 (3d ed. 1973).
40. On the remaining issue, the court held that on any legislative day
during the first fifteen calendar days prior to the eight-day recess mandated
by LA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 7, either house may consider and finally pass a bill.
